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Viewing cable 06BERN1867, S/CT CRUMPTON PRESSES THE SWISS TO SHARE MORE INTEL \

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Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
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Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06BERN1867**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06BERN1867	2006-10-02 14:48	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Embassy Bern

Appears in these articles:

[www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers](#)

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSD #1867/01 2751448
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 021448Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3192
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2606
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0103

80378 2006-10-02 14:48:00 06BERN1867 Embassy Bern SECRET VZCZCXYZ0000\
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DE RUEHSD #1867/01 2751448\
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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2606\
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SIPDIS \
STATE FOR S/CT, EUR, ISN \
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2031 \
TAGS: PTER ETTC SZ
SUBJECT: S/CT CRUMPTON PRESSES THE SWISS TO SHARE MORE INTEL \
Classified By: DCM Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d/h \
1.(S) Summary: Counterterrorism Coordinator Henry Crumpton \
met with Swiss officials on September 7 to urge better \
intelligence sharing on terrorism. Crumpton highlighted the \
importance of a broad exchange of information as a necessary \
means to defeating terrorist plans. Swiss officials \
expressed surprise at USG dissatisfaction with their \
performance, but pointed to various Swiss legal and resource \
reasons to explain their inability to share more. Swiss \
officials added that they welcomed the President's decision \
to transfer 14 high-value al-Qaida suspects to military \
custody, asserting that more such gestures would make \
U.S.-Swiss counterterrorism cooperation easier to sell to the \
Swiss public. End summary. \
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Surprise at USG Dissatisfaction \
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2.(S) Prior to attending the U.S.-Swiss sponsored "Black Ice" \
bioterrorism exercise held September 7-8 in Montreux, U.S. \
Counterterrorism Coordinator Crumpton met in Bern with senior \
Swiss officials in order to convey the message that \
intelligence sharing needed to improve. At a breakfast \
meeting with Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Deputy \
Political Director Anton Thalmann, DFA Security Policy \
director Jacques Pitteloud, and Poloff, Ambassador Crumpton \
said that the USG, while pleased that Switzerland has frozen \
over 34 million Swiss Francs (about \$28 million) in \
Al-Qaida/Taliban assets, was concerned that suspected \
terrorists continued to operate in Switzerland, and that \
Swiss officials were too restrictive in what information they \
shared. Crumpton stressed that it was not sufficient to \
share only intelligence information having a specific U.S. \
nexus; only with the broad picture can governments adequately \
assess the threat. \
3.(S) Deputy PolDir Thalmann expressed surprise at the USG's \
dissatisfaction with the Swiss performance. He had not heard \
this dissatisfaction expressed with regard to Swiss Justice \
Minister Blocher's August visit to Washington for the signing \
of the new Operative Working Agreement (OWA) on \
counterterrorism cooperation. Pitteloud -- a former Swiss \
intelligence official aware of (and sympathetic to the USG \
concerns) intelligence sharing shortfalls -- offered that USG \
officials may have wished to emphasize the positive as they \
signed the OWA. Thalmann promised to consult with his \
interagency colleagues. \
4.(S) Noting President Bush's speech the previous evening \
announcing the transfer of 14 high-value suspects from \
confidential confinement to Guantanamo Bay, Thalmann and \
SIPDIS \
Pitteloud said they were pleased the USG was moving closer to \
what they considered a more transparent approach to \
detainees. Pitteloud regretted that differences over \
detainees, overflights, and renditions had made closer \
Swiss-U.S. cooperation less popular with the Swiss public. \
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Bank Secrecy and Countering Terrorist Financing \
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5.(C) Meeting later with Swiss officials from the Swiss \
Banking Commission and from the departments of Foreign \
Affairs, Economics, and Finance, Ambassador Crumpton -- \
joined by Embassy law enforcement and Econoff -- observed \
that Swiss bank secrecy laws proved a formidable obstacle \

regarding how much information the Swiss could share with the U.S. on suspect assets. Urs Zulauf, spokesman for the Swiss Banking Commission, explained that the Swiss needed very specific information from the USG in order to freeze assets or start criminal cases; information that was not always forthcoming. He explained that the Swiss legal system had very explicit requirements regarding terrorism financing: "we have no flexibility". \

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6.(C) Ambassador Crumpton acknowledged Swiss concerns and constraints and indicated he would relay this to Washington agencies. He requested, however, that the Swiss think creatively about ways the government could improve its information sharing. He stressed that there is no piece of information that is "purely domestic" as terrorists are micro-level actors with a macro-level impact. He noted that intelligence and information-sharing programs such as Swift have benefited Switzerland and have produced information -- Swiss-origin information -- that resulted in anti-terrorism cases. Ambassador Crumpton stressed that it was inadequate for the Banking Commission, DFA and others in the Swiss Administration to restrict information exchanges to threats specifically identifiable to the United States. Important puzzle pieces in the global war on terrorism could be disregarded if this limited approach is not expanded. \

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Accustomed to Police Cooperation, not Intel Sharing \-----\

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7.(S) Charge joined Ambassador Crumpton for a meeting with Federal Police Director Jean-Luc Vez, Jean-Paul Rouiller and Michel Perler of the Federal Criminal Police (BKP), and Juerg Buehler, deputy director of the Service for Analysis and Protection (Internal Intelligence Service). Ambassador Crumpton thanked Vez and Justice Minister Blocher for pressing forward on the U.S.-Swiss Operative Working Agreement (OWA). He hoped the new OWA would be more than a piece of paper, but rather a vehicle for real counterterrorism cooperation. Given the threat faced by both countries, one could not confine intelligence sharing only to "Swiss-specific" or "US-specific" intelligence. The Heathrow plot was thwarted because of good intelligence sharing among different services, which we were sharing even before we knew the American nexus. All friendly services should share as much as possible with each other. \

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8.(S) The Swiss officials chafed at the suggestion by Embassy law enforcement officials that they had not been responsive to specific requests for information. Traditionally, the Swiss had turned to the police forces to undertake investigations of all threats, including terrorism. He was convinced that it was time to develop the intelligence side, but the Swiss services were small and it would take considerable time to push the changes through the legislative process. Vez described U.S.-Swiss cooperation as good, but asserted that the USG needed to provide more detailed information if we expected the Swiss to prosecute terrorists. \

(Comment: The Swiss complaint that USG intelligence is insufficiently specific reflects their passive approach to counterterrorism -- one would hope Swiss investigators could use this "lead-information" to build their own cases, rather than await complete criminal cases to be provided them on a platter. End comment.) \

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9.(S) Charge observed that recent polling had shown the Swiss public relatively unconcerned about terrorism. Asked how he viewed the threat, Vez said that he was confident there was "no threat to Switzerland," but he realized the situation could change rapidly. There was an evident "individualization" of the jihadi threat, and the fact that there was less coordination and control by a central command widened the threat, as seen with the attempted train bombings in Germany. Rouiller followed with an informative slide presentation on the Swiss nexus with senior al-Qaida leaders dating back to the early 1990s. \

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10.(S) Pulling Vez aside at the end, Ambassador Crumpton \

underlined the gravity of the situation, describing \ Switzerland as nearly the only country in Western Europe to \ have not provided a response to our information on the \ al-Qaida threat in Europe. Vez was vague in his response, \ giving no indication he would improve things in the near term. \ \

----- \ Comment \ ----- \ \ 11.(S) The Swiss Service for Analysis and Prevention (DAP) is \ uncooperative toward Embassy law enforcement and other \ officials. This could partly be due to the anti-Americanism \ of DAP's director Urs von Daeniken, but the problem is more \ widespread; DAP doesn't share very well with other services \ or within the Swiss bureaucracy itself. What little \ information does get shared is by the Federal Criminal Police \ (BKP), a sister office in the Federal Police Bureau, whose \ counterterrorism cell hosts an FBI agent. However, even the \ BKP's information tends to be solely U.S.-specific, and short \ of the broader picture desired. \

12.(S) Domestically, DAP has little to lose from poor \ cooperation with the U.S. Public sentiment leans against \ involvement in intelligence gathering, foreign or domestic. \ Justice Minister Blocher's attitude toward the situation has \ not been as helpful as initially hoped when he took office in \ January 2004. Although he is obviously aware of the problem, \ he apparently sees no political percentage to making a swift \ change. Embassy will continue to encourage senior USG \ officials to send the message conveyed by Ambassador Crumpton \ (and Treasury Under Secretary Stuart Levey after him), namely \ the need to share intelligence information broadly, in order \ to tackle the threat. \

CONEWAY \